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COMMENT
LONG-ARM WRESTLING WITH PENNSYLVANIA'S
JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS:
THE REACH OF SECTION 8305
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of a court to exercise jurisdiction over the parties in an
action has always been a matter of primary concern to legislatures, the
judiciary and legal scholars. Particularly troublesome have been the special
problems which arise when the defendant is not a resident of the state in
which a judicial action is brought.' Most states have developed so-called
"long-arm" statutes to define the parameters of that courts' jurisdiction
over nonresidents.
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, originally enacted in 1970,2 provides
for jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts over nonresident individuals in
basically three situations.3 Section 8303 covers nonresident individuals who
have committed a tort within Pennsylvania;4 sections 8304 and 8309
deal with nonresident individuals who have done business within the state ;5
1. The ability of a plaintiff to require the defendant to defend suit in the plain-
tiff's state may be critical to the outcome of the litigation, or even the plaintiff's de-
cision to bring suit in the first instance. The burden on the party who must travel
to another state, either to defend or bring suit, is often very great. He must bear
costs of transportation; he may face hostile factfinders biased in favor of the local
party; and he may have less favorable substantive laws applied to the controversy.
See Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L. REv. 909, 911
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments - Jurisdiction]. Further, because statutes
of limitations are generally considered to be procedural for choice of law purposes, it
is possible that a nonresident defendant may have to defend a claim brought in another
state after the statute of limitations in his state has run. See Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289, 291 (1956)
2. Act of July 1, 1970, No. 152, [1970] Pa. Laws 444 (repealed 1972) (reenacted
as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1975)).
3. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
4. See id. § 8303. Section 8303 provides for jurisdiction over
[a]ny nonresident of this Commonwealth who, acting individually, under or
through a fictitious business name, or through an agent, servant or employee,
shall have committed a tortious act within this Commonwealth ....
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See id. §§ 8304, 8309. Section 8304 provides for jurisdiction over
[a]ny nonresident of this Commonwealth who, acting individually under or
through a fictitious business name, or through an agent, servant or employee,
shall have done any business in this Commonwealth . ...
Id. § 8304 (emphasis added).
Section 8309(a) defines "doing business" as:
(1) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar
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and section 8305 provides for jurisdiction over nonresident individuals who,
through conduct outside of Pennsylvania, have caused "any harm" within
the state." Due to the uncertainty of the intended scope of section 8305, a
number of courts, primarily federal district courts, 7 recently have had
occasion to interpret the language of that section.8 Some of these courts
have interpreted section 8305 very liberally, construing the section to pro-
vide for jurisdiction to an extent almost coterminous with the requirements
of constitutional due process. 9
The purpose of this comment is to analyze section 8305 in light of both
the limitations on jurisdiction over nonresidents mandated by the require-
ments of constitutional due process and the overall scheme underlying the
Pennsylvania long-arm statute. This analysis will primarily be accomplished
(2) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of
thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with
the intention of initiating a series of such acts.
(3) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth.
(4) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth,
whether or not such business requires license or approval by the Commonwealth
or any of its agencies.
(5) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this
Commonwealth.
Id. § 8309(a) (emphasis added).
6. See id. § 8305. Section 8305 provides in pertinent part:
Any nonresident of this Commonwealth who, acting outside of this Common-
wealth, . . . shall have caused any harm within this Commonwealth . . . shall be
subject to service of process in any civil action or proceeding instituted in the
courts of this Commonwealth arising out of or by reason of any such conduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Because diversity of citizenship may provide a basis for federal court jurisdic-
tion, a substantial number of suits against nonresidents are brought in federal district
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Stifel v. Lind-
horst, 393 F. Supp. 1085 (M.D. Pa. 1975); General Heat & Power Co. v. Diversified
Mort. Investors, 65 F.R.D. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp.
915 (E.D. Pa. 1974); McAndrew v. Burnett, 374 F. Supp. 460 (M.D. Pa. 1974);
Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Action Indus., Inc. v. Wiedeman, 236 Pa. Super. 447, 346 A.2d 798 (1975) ; Stepnowski
v. Avery, 234 Pa. Super. 492, 340 A.2d 465 (1974) ; Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v.
Saloom, 52 Pa. D. & C.2d 22 (C.P. Mercer County 1971).
9. See, e.g., Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ; Aamco Auto-
matic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1973). A few states
expressly provide for jurisdiction over nonresidents which is coterminous with that
permitted by the United States Constitution, thereby eliminating the need for a sepa-
rate statutory inquiry. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I.
GEN. LAWs ANN. § 9-5-33 (1970).
A similar result was effected in New Jersey by the state supreme court's
promulgation of Civil Practice Rule 4:4-4. See N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:4-4. Pennsyl-
vania has provided for jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the full extent per-
mitted by the Constitution. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (Supp. 1975).
Section 8309(b) provides that
the jurisdiction and venue of courts of the Commonwealth shall extend to all
foreign corporations and the powers exercised by them to the fullest extent
allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
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by focusing upon the cases which have been compelled to deal with the
nebulous language of section 8305. Finally, the Comment will consider
several different theories of the intended coverage of section 8305 and
propose alternatives for the change of the Pennsylvania individual long-arm
statute.
Section 8305, at least on its face, provides an extremely broad basis
for jurisdiction over nonresident individuals. Because the language of
the section apparently confers jurisdiction without the necessity of showing
that the nonresident was "doing business" in Pennsylvania and may be
satisfied by a single act of a nonresident defendant, it is necessary initially
to discuss briefly the limitations on the applicability of the section which
result from the consideration of the requirement of due process of law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In determining whether a court can properly exercise jurisdiction over
a nonresident individual courts must use a "two-step" test. Initially, the
court must decide whether any provision of the state long-arm statute gives
it the power to exercise jurisdiction.10 Secondly, it must determine whether
the assertion of jurisdiction would be violative of the defendant's due process
rights."
In attempting to delineate the constitutional requirements which must
be fulfilled in order to uphold jurisdiction, the United States Supreme
Court, in the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
12
held that due process is satisfied when the nonresident has "certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 13
Realizing the inherently subjective nature of their newly enunciated test,
the Court stated that the test could not be "simply mechanical or quanita-
tive," but rather depended "upon the quality and nature" of the non-
resident's contacts with the forum.'
4
10. When a state has provided for long-arm jurisdiction to the full extent per-
mitted by the Constitution, the statutory determination is perfunctory. See note 9
supra.
11. Although the "two-step" approach is basic, courts often merge discussion of
statutory interpretation with that of due process. This appears to have often led to
unusual statutory interpretations in order to reach the result which would have been
obtained under a purely constitutional analysis. See Note, The Virginia Long-Arm
Statute, 51 VA. L. REV. 719, 731-32 (1965).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe involved a suit brought by the state
of Washington against a foreign corporation to collect an unemployment compensa-
tion tax levied upon the corporation's salesmen who has been working within the state.
Id. at 311-12.
13. Id. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
14. 326 U.S. at 319. The Court also stated:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obliga-
tions arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
[VOL. 21
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Since its decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court has refined
the substantive requirements of the "minimum contacts" test in only two
instances. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 15 the Court
stated that a "nonresident must have a 'substantial connection' with the
forum state in order to satisfy due process."1 6 The Court in McGee upheld
California's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose only
contact with the state was the mailing of a life insurance policy into Cali-
fornia and its later receipt of premium payments by mail from within the
state.1 7 The McGee decision is especially significant because the Court
for the first time upheld jurisdiction on the basis of a single contract be-
tween a foreign corporation and a resident of the forum state.' s
The following year, in Hanson v. Denckla,19 the Court made it clear
that due process remains a viable restriction upon a state's exercise of juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. The Court stated that a nonresident
must "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws" in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts.20
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can,
in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
Id.
15. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. Id. at 223.
17. Id. at 221-22. The Court noted California's "interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." Id. at 223.
Although the Court acknowledged that requiring the insurer to defend a suit in the
insured's state may be an inconvenience, such an inconvenience was held not to amount
to denial of due process. Id. at 224. In support of its holding the Court noted that
there had been a "clearly discernible [trend] toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over .. .nonresidents"; a trend attributed in part to the increased
amount of interstate business, as well as the diminished burden, brought about by
modern transportation and communication, upon a nonresident defending a suit in a
state where it engaged in economic activity. Id. at 222-23.
Although McGee has been interpreted by some writers and courts as limited
to situations involving the insurer-insured relationship, it has more often been held
to establish principles of general application. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Long-
Arm: An Analytical Justification, 17 VILL. L. REV. 73, 77 (1971).
18. 355 U.S. at 223. The Court held it "sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State."
Id. (emphasis added). Although the Court, in Hess v. Powloski, 274 U.S. 325 (1927)
(sustaining the constitutionality of Massachusetts' nonresident motor vehicle statute),
had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction based upon a single contact with the forum state,
that case and similar prior cases were predicated upon the theory that the nonresident
had given implied consent to be sued by engaging in an activity subject to special
regulation by the state. See Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 918.
For further discussion of the constitutional requirements which must be satisfied
when jurisdiction is based upon a single act, see, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco
Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Corporations Based on a Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEO.
L.J. 342 (1958).
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20. Id. at 253, citing International Shoe Co, v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945). Hanson involved a trust agreement which had been executed in Delaware by
a Delaware trust company and a settlor-beneficiary who resided in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 238. The settlor-beneficiary subsequently moved to Florida, and the trustee
accordingly sent the trust income to her in that state. While the Court compared the
COMMENT
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
None of these decisions of the Supreme Court definitively stated
whether in all cases, due process requires the plaintiff's cause of action to
arise out of the nonresident's connection with the forum state. In Perkins v.
Benquet Mining Co., 21 the Court answered this question in the negative,
holding that due process did not prohibit Ohio from exercising jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation which had done sufficiently substantial business
in the state, even though the cause of action arose from conduct entirely
distinct from the corporation's activities in Ohio. 22 It does appear, how-
ever, that the existence of a causal connection between the nonresident's
activity in the forum and the plaintiff's cause of action is one of the factors
to be considered in determining whether due process is satisfied,23 and that
"several bits of trust administration" performed by the settlor in Florida to the mailing
of premiums in McGee, it could not find anything analogous to the solicitation present
in McGee. Id. Moreover, the Hanson Court, in discussing the McGee decision, reiter-
ated California's "manifest interest" in providing redress for its citizens injured by
insurers, noting the specially enacted state legislation upon the subject. Id.
Hanson, a 5-4 decision, has been severely criticized because of the "purpose-
fully availing" test's inapplicability in particular jurisdictional situations. For example,
it is difficult to think of a tortfeasor, acting outside of the forum state and causing
injury within the state, as being motivated by the benefit and the protection of the
laws of the forum state. As a result, Hanson has often been limited to its facts or
used only as a secondary test of appropriate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966) (rule cannot be
applied properly to products liability cases). Alternatively, the "purposefully availing"
language in Hanson has been equated with "foreseeability." See, e.g., Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1963); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling
Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963). See also Comment,
supra note 17, at 78-81, 105.
21. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
22. Id. at 447-49. Perkins involved a suit brought in Ohio against a Philippine
corporation which had carried on a "continuous and systematic, but limited, part of
its general business" in that state during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines
in World War II. Id. at 438. The cause of action did not arise in Ohio and did not
relate to the corporation's activities there. Id. See Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1664, 1670-71
(1958). This annotation took the position that it should be irrelevant in all cases
whether the cause of action arose out of the nonresident's activity within the forum
state. Id.; accord, Bork v. Mills, 458 Pa. 228, 232-33, 329 A.2d 247, 250 (1974)
(dissenting opinion).
However, some commentators have suggested that the decision in Perkins
has limited application because, inter alia, it arose during World War II, when suit
could not be brought where the cause of action actually arose. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 18, at 354.
23. See, e.g., Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 31 (8th Cir.
1973); Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1974). For an example
of a cause of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts within the forum state, see
notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
Some statutes expressly provide for jurisdiction over a nonresident who does
business within the forum state as to causes of action that do not arise out of this
business. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.081(5) (1969) (corporation with business
office within state and "actually engaged in the transaction of business therefrom") ;
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(1) (d) (Supp. 1975) (defendant "engaged in substantial
and not isolated activities" within state). See generally UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND
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when jurisdiction is based upon a single act such a causal connection must
be found.
2 4
Thus, in Bork v. Mills, 25 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the fact that a nonresident was statutorily "doing business" within the
state26 was insufficient to support jurisdiction when the cause of action was
unrelated to that activity.27 The court stated that the nonresident's activity
had to be " 'so continuous and substantial as to make it reasonable' for the
Commonwealth to exercise jurisdiction over their admittedly unrelated
cause of action.
'28
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, like those in many other states, has
to a great extent been the product of piecemeal legislation enacted in re-
sponse to significant state and federal judicial decisions concerning juris-
diction.2 9 For example, prior to International Shoe,80 Pennsylvania's juris-
diction over nonresidents was limited to owners or operators of motor
vehicles,8 ' business corporations registered in the state, 2 owners or op-
erators of aircraft, 83 and owners, tenants or users of real estate located
24. Note, supra note 18, at 353-55; note 23 and accompanying text supra. In
International Shoe, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]t has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the
corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action un-
connected with the activities there.
326 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
25. 458 Pa. 228, 329 A.2d 247 (1974). In Bork, a Maryland defendant's truck
was involved in an automobile accident in Virginia. The plaintiff was a Pennsylvania
resident and a passenger in the automobile. Id. at 229-30, 329 A.2d at 248.
26. Id. at 231, 329 A.2d at 249. The plaintiff, alleging that the defendant had
"haul[ed] freight for hire" within Pennsylvania, asserted jurisdiction under the "doing
business" sections of the long-arm statute. Id. at 230, 329 A.2d at 248-49. For the
text of these sections, see note 5 supra.
27. 458 Pa. at 231, 329 A.2d at 249. The accident involving defendant's truck in
Virginia admittedly did not arise out of the defendant's business within Pennsylvania.
458 Pa. at 231, 329 A.2d at 249.
28. 458 Pa. at 231, 329 A.2d at 249, quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 35 (1971).
29. See Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 998-1008. For a history
of the evolution of the Pennsylvania statute, see Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 476 F.2d
1216, 1218-20 (3d Cir. 1973).
30. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
31. See Act of May 14, 1929, No. 563, § 1, [1929] Pa. Laws 1721, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 2001 (1971) (suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 2100 insofar
as inconsistent with rules 2076 to 2082).
32. See Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, art. X, § 1011, [1933] Pa. Laws 422
(repealed 1972). For a comprehensive history of Pennsylvania's attempts to assert
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Cor-
poration in Pennsylvania: A Time for Change, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 82-84 (1969).
33. See Act of May 7, 1935, No. 53, § 1, [1935] Pa. Laws 130, as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1410(a) (1963) (suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 2100 insofar as
inconsistent with rules 2076 to 2082).
6
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within the state.34 Following International Shoe, the Pennsylvania legis-
lature enacted more expansive long-arm provisions,35 giving its courts
jurisdiction over unauthorized insurers, 36 unregistered corporations "doing
business" within the state,37 owners or operators of water vessels, 38 whole-
salers of malt or brewed beverages, 39 and owners or operators of motor
boats.
40
In 1970, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the state's first com-
prehensive long-arm statute dealing with jurisdiction over nonresident
individuals.41 This statute was transferred almost verbatim in 1972 into
Title 42 of Pennsylvania's statutes as a result of the legislature's desire to




As one of the cornerstones of Pennsylvania's long-arm jurisdiction,
section 8303 provides for jurisdiction over any nonresident who has "com-
mitted a tortious act within [Pennsylvania] . ' 43 The language of the pro-
vision necessitates a court initially deciding the often difficult question of
where a "tortious act" occurs, and unfortunately, no uniform rule or test
has been accepted as providing an answer.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Restatement) adopted the posi-
tion that "[t] he place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."'44 Because the actual
34. See Act of July 2, 1937, No. 558, § 1, [1937] Pa. Laws 2748, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (Supp. 1975).
35. While the trend has been towards more expansive jurisdiction under these
statutes, most states have failed to give their courts the power to exercise their juris-
diction over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowable under the Constitution. See
Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1008. This may be attributable either
to a conscious decision to restrict jurisdiction or a failure of state legislatures to
reexamine their jurisdictional bases following new Supreme Court decisions involving
jurisdiction. See id. at 1007-08.
36. Act of May 20, 1949, No. 447, § 2, [1949] Pa. Laws 1491 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1005.2(a) (1971)).
37. Act of September 26, 1951, No. 366, § 22, [1951] Pa. Laws 1489 (repealed
1972).
38. Act of Nov. 10, 1959, No. 500, § 1, [1959] Pa. Laws 1404 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 336 (Supp. 1975)).
39. Act of Sept. 16, 1961, No. 606, § 1, [1961] Pa. Laws 1364 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 338 (Supp. 1975)).
40. Act of June 4, 1969, No. 19, § 1, [1969] Pa. Laws 65 (codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, § 2001 (1971) (suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 2100 insofar as inconsistent
with rules 2076 to 2082).
41. See Act of July 1, 1970, No. 152, [1970] Pa. Laws 444 (repealed 1972).
42. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
43. Id. § 8303. For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). The Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, however, adopted the position that the law of the
state which "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties"
is to be used to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
[VOL. 21
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injury is generally the last event necessary for liability, those states which
follow the Restatement view have usually found that the place of the injury
is determinative of the locus of the tortious act. 45 While there are Penn-
sylvania cases which have seemingly followed the Restatement's position, 46
there is also authority for holding that a tortious act occurs wherever the
act or omission which caused the injury takes place. 47 This latter inter-
pretation would result in section 8303 being read as providing for juris-
diction over nonresident individuals who have "caus[ed] tortious injury
by an act or omission in this state." 48 Moreover, it has been argued that
such an interpretation is "practically compelled" since section 8305 was
issue in tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3145 (1971). Four
factors to be considered in deciding the law to be applied are:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
435-36, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961).
46. See, e.g., Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1973);
Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Wilk v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 421 Pa. 161, 164, 218 A.2d 778, 780 (1966).
Some commentators have suggested that the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania
have often been more liberal than the state courts in allowing jurisdiction over non-
residents. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Unregistered Foreign Corporations Doing
Business in Pennsylvania: Confusion in Perspective, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 879, 885
(1966) ; 76 DICK. L. REV. 385, 387 (1972).
47. See McAndrew v. Burnett, 374 F. Supp. 460, 463 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (discussed
in note 102 infra) ; Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
In Rufo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting a statutory provision which
provided for jurisdiction over foreign corporations "doing business" in Pennsylvania
"in an action arising out of acts or omissions" within the state, determined that it was
not bound, when considering the question of jurisdiction, by conflict of law principles
which localize the tort to the place where the injury was suffered. Id. at 19-20, 173
A.2d at 127-28. Acknowledging that the defendant's only act was its negligent manu-
facture of the defective product, which had admittedly occurred outside of the state,
the court concluded that the relevant consideration was neither where the injury
occurred nor where the cause of action arose, but rather where the defendant's negli-
gent acts or omissions took place. Id. The court reasoned "to hold otherwise, -
i.e., that 'act' means 'injury' - is to legislate and that we cannot do." Id. at 20,
173 A.2d at 128 (emphasis supplied by the court).
It does appear that the conflicts question of whose law to apply and the
question of the ability of a court to exercise jurisdiction involve entirely different
considerations. For example, there are many instances in which a court may properly
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident, but still apply the law of another state under
conflict of laws principles. The use of conflicts of laws principles in deciding whether
jurisdiction is proper, therefore, merely clouds the basic issues. For a discussion of
the semantic problems involved in the interpretation of various long-arm provisions,
see In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability
Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1028, 1035-43 (1965).
48. Comment, supra note 17, at 86-88. The commentator also expressed the
opinion that in determining jurisdiction, Pennsylvania had not adopted the Restatement
view concerning where a tortious act occurs. Id. at 87-88; see notes 44-47 and accom-
panying text supra.
8
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intended to cover those situations where the nonresident causes harm by
out-of-state tortious activity.
49
B. Sections 8304 and 8309
The second principal provision underlying Pennsylvania's long-arm
scheme is section 8304, which provides for jurisdiction over any nonresident
individual who has "done any business in [Pennsylvania]. "50 The section
must be considered in light of its definitional counterpart, section 8309,
which defines five classes of "doing business" for the purposes of the
statute.51 The first two classes concern activity undertaken "for the pur-
pose . . . of realizing pecuniary benefit"; section 8309(a) (1) covers "the
doing... of a series of similar acts" for that purpose 52 and section 8309 (a)-
(2) involves the "doing of a single act ... with the intention of initiating a
series of such acts."'5 3 The profit motive is not statutorily relevant in the
section's final three classes of activity. 54 Section 8309 (a) (3) covers "[t] he
shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through [the state] ,"5
section 8309 (a) (4) encompasses "[t] he engaging in any business or pro-
fession within [the state]," 56 and section 8309(a)(5) deals with "[t]he
ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within [the
state] .)57
One of the difficulties confronting plaintiffs attempting to assert juris-
diction under one of the long-arm statute's "doing business" provisions is
the possibility that a single act may be insufficient to support jurisdiction
49. See Comment, supra note 17, at 87. For the text of section 8305, see note 6
supra. Further, this interpretation would make section 8303 almost identical to section
1.03(a) (3) of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (Uniform
Act), which provides for jurisdiction when a nonresident "caus[es] tortious injury
by an act or omission in this state." UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a) (3). The Uniform Act has been enacted in Arkansas, the
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and the Virgin Islands. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2501 et seq. (Supp. 1975) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 13-421 et seq.
(1973) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, §§ 1 et seq. (Supp. 1975) ; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1701.01 et seq. (Supp. 1975) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4901 et seq.
(Supp. 1967). It has also been enacted with some modification in Louisiana, Ohio,
and Virginia See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:3201 et seq. (1968) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2307.381 et seq. (Page Supp. 1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8304 (Supp. 1975). For the text of this section,
see note 4 supra. Although the "doing business" test was abrogated as a constitutional
requirement by International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-15, many states still couch their
long-arm statutes in this familiar language. See Developments - Jurisdiction, supra
note 1, at 1000-01.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309 (Supp. 1975). For the text of this section,
see note 5 supra.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(a) (1) (Supp. 1975).
53. Id. § 8309(a) (2).
54. While there are court statements that the profit motive is essential to the
"doing business" test, these cases are distinguishable in that they dealt with sec-
tions 8309(a) (1) and 8309(a) (2), and not sections 8309(a) (3)-(a) (5). See, e.g.,
McAndrew v. Burnett, 374 F. Supp. 460, 462 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(a) (3) (Supp. 1975).
56. Id. § 8309(a) (4).
57. Id. § 8309(a) (5).
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under the statute. Courts have almost universally held that the primary
"doing business" provisions, sections 8309(a) (1) and (a) (2), require a
"systematic course of conduct as contrasted with isolated or sporadic oc-
currences."'58 The 1970 amendment to the "doing business" sections
changed the prior language to provide that section 8309(a) (3), the "ship-
ping" provision, would constitute an independent form of "doing business,"
without the "systematic course of conduct" requirement. 5  The language
of sections 8309(a) (4) and (a) (5), added to the list of "doing business"
activities by the same 1970 amendment, would also appear to allow juris-
diction based upon a single act.60
Therefore, whereas the United States Supreme Court has held that
the Constitution does not prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant based upon a single act,61 Pennsylvania has made
a policy decision that, in general, a "systematic course of conduct" within
the state is a prerequisite to a finding that a nonresident was "doing busi-
ness" for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 62 This statutory requirement
best illustrates Pennsylvania's apparent legislative decision that its juris-
diction over nonresident individuals should be less extensive than that
allowed under the Constitution. This same requirement also appears to
have caused many plaintiffs to assert jurisdiction, often alternatively, under
either section 8303 or section 8305, which, being single-act provisions,
contain no such requirement.
63
58. Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185, 240 A.2d 505, 510 (1967);
accord, Gorso v. Bell Equip. Co., 476 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1973); Rosen v.
Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Aamco Automatic Transmissions,
Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Contra, Machensworth v.
American Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp. 373, 375. See also Columbia Metal
Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 526 F.2d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. Act of July 1, 1970, No. 152, [1970] Pa. Laws 444 (repealed 1972) (reen-
acted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1975)) ; see Aquarium Pharm.,
Inc. v. Industrial Pressing & Packaging, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 441, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
60. Act of July 1, 1970, No. 152, [1970] Pa. Laws 444 (repealed 1972) (reen-
acted as PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 42, §§ 8301 et seq. (Supp. 1975). One commentator has
cogently argued that section 8309(a) (4) was intended to make the "doing business"
requirements much less restrictive. Comment, supra note 17, at 93-96. The author
concluded that the phrase "engaging in any business" considerably broadened the
"doing business" basis for jurisdiction by encompassing: "(1) instances where the
nonresident has entered the forum for pecuniary gain; and (2) instances where a con-
tract was either made or performable within the state." Id. at 94 (footnote omitted).
This interpretation, however, does not seem to have been adopted, as of yet,
by any court in Pennsylvania. For example, in Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915
(E.D. Pa. 1974), wherein the contract was both negotiated and to be performed in
Pennsylvania, the court summarily stated that it was indisputable that the section was
inapplicable. Id. at 918 n.1.
61. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). See also
notes 15-24 and accompanying text supra.
62. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g., Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
10




The final jurisdiction conferring provision of the state's long-arm
scheme is section 8305. This section authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction
over any nonresident individual who, through activity outside of Penn-
sylvania, causes "any harm" within the state, in any suit arising out of or
by reason of such conduct.
0 4
The requirement that the plaintiff's cause of action arise out of the
nonresident's conduct which caused harm within Pennsylvania is self-
defining and, in fact, may be constitutionally mandated since the section is
primarily a single-act provision. 65 However, when section 8305 is viewed
within the entire scheme of the long-arm statute, interpretation of some
other language in the section presents several analytical difficulties. It is
not clear: 1) what activity is within the scope of the section, i.e., whether
the section confers jurisdiction in both tort and contract actions; 2) whether
"harm" as used in the section includes both personal injury and financial
loss; 3) when the requirement that "any harm" must have been suffered
within Pennsylvania has been satisfied; and 4) whether it is necessary to
determine that the "cause" of the plaintiff's harm, as well as its effect,
occurred within the state.
1. Requirement of "Out-of-State Activity"
The initial prerequisite to the application of section 8305, that the non-
resident acted outside of the state, could produce illogical results. In the
abstract, it is difficult to understand the rationale of this requirement since
it would seem that jurisdiction over a nonresident would be more appro-
priate when his activity occurred within, rather than outside of, the forum
state - the in-state activity necessarily increasing due process "minimum
contacts." No theoretical problem exists, of course, if all out-of-state activity
which would subject a nonresident to jurisdiction under section 8305 would
also, if the activity took place within the state, subject the nonresident to
jurisdiction under some other provision of the long-arm statute. However,
under present interpretations of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, it
would appear that there would be some situations in which out-of-state
activity which would have satisfied the requirements of section 8305, would
not, if it had occurred within the state, have satisfied the requirements of
any provision of the present long-arm statute. An example of this might
be taken from the factual situation presented in Rosen v. Solomon.6 Rosen
involved a suit by a Pennsylvania resident against a California resident for
the alleged breach of a stock option agreement. 67 The defendant's attorney
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8305 (Supp. 1975). For the text of this section,
see note 6 supra.
65. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
66. 374 F. Supp. 915, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
67. Id. at 917.
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had negotiated the agreement in Pennsylvania, where it was later prepared.6"
Following execution by the defendant in California, the agreement was
returned to Pennsylvania and signed by the plaintiff.6 9 After the plaintiff
exercised the option, scheduling the closing in Pennsylvania, the defendant
allegedly defaulted.70  The court held that the requirements of "doing
business" were not satisfied,71 but found that the defendant's out-of-state
activity - apparently his failure to go through with the agreement 72 -
had caused harm within the state and accordingly held that section 8305
supported personal jurisdiction.
73
It is submitted that if the defendant in Rosen had personally come to
Pennsylvania for the contract's negotiation, execution, and subsequent
breach, section 8305 would have been inapplicable because the requisite
out-of-state activity would have been lacking. Moreover, although his
presence in Pennsylvania for each of these events would have increased his
contacts with the state for due process purposes, personal jurisdiction would
not have been available under any other provision of the present long-arm
statute.
74
This illogical result - which it is submitted could not have been in-
tended by the legislature - could nevertheless have been avoided if section
8305 had been read by the court as the "other half" of section 8303, that is,
by limiting the section to tortious activity. Accordingly, section 8303
would cover tortious injury caused by an in-state act or omission, while
section 8305 would be limited to encompassing out-of-state tortious activity
causing injury within Pennsylvania. 75 This would leave breach of contract
68. Id. The agreement had a provision in it which stated that it was to be con-
strued in accordance with the laws of Pennsylvania. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The closing had been continued once by agreement. Id.
71. Id. at 918. The court concluded that the agreement's negotiation and the events
leading to its breach constituted a single integrated transaction rather than the required
"systematic course of conduct." See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
72. Other out-of-state activity on the part of the defendant included sending his
attorney to Pennsylvania to negotiate the agreement and his execution of it in
California. 374 F. Supp. at 917. However, it would seem that it was the agreement's
breach which caused the plaintiff's harm. Because most breaches of contract are mani-
fested by a failure to act, rather than by any overt action, it would seem that an argu-
ment could be made that the legislature's phrasing of the section in terms of a positive
occurrence could preclude its application in many breach of contract situations. See
Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1004.
73. 374 F. Supp. at 919.
74. Jurisdiction would not have been possible under section 8303 because no
tortious act was involved; nor would this have changed the fact that only a single
integrated transaction was involved, for purposes of "doing business" within the
meaning of section 8304 and 8309. See note 71 supra.
75. Moreover, interpreting sections 8303 and 8305 as complementary would make
the Pennsylvania jurisdictional design very similar to that provided for by sections
1.03(a) (3) and (a) (4) of the Uniform Act. Many states have avoided the interpre-
tive problems concerning the locus of a tortious act by passing the Uniform Act, or a
similar statute, thereby providing separate long-arm provisions which differentiate
between conduct in the state causing tortious injury and conduct outside of the state
COMMENT
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situations to be covered exclusively by the "doing business" sections of the
long-arm statute. It is submitted that such an interpretation is the most
logical and consistent explanation of the long-arm statutory scheme.
An argument along this line was made by the defendant in Rosen, but
rejected by the court.76 The Rosen court emphasized that the specific refer-
ence to tortious acts in section 8303, coupled with the absence of any
"language whatsoever which would limit its application to tortious acts,"
indicated a legislative intention that section 8305 encompass acts other than
only torts.
77
However, the lack of specific language in section 8305 limiting its
application to tortious activity does not necessarily settle the question. A
reasonable alternative explanation of the legislature's failure to be more
precise in the section's language may be the prior interpretive difficulties
regarding the locus of a tortious act.78 An intentional legislative decision
to omit any reference to "tortious acts" may have been made to avoid even
the slightest possibility of restrictive judicial decisions upon the question
of the intended scope of the section.79
2. Nature of "Harm'"
The second prerequisite to the application of section 8305 is that the
nonresident must have caused "harm" within Pennsylvania." ° It would
appear that whenever a nonresident is sued he has allegedly caused or
will cause the plaintiff harm. However, an argument can be made that the
term "harm" was intended by the legislature to be limited to personal injury
causing tortious injury within the state. Section 1.03(a) (4) of the Uniform Act
provides for jurisdiction when a nonresident
[causes] tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this state ....
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03 (a) (4) (emphasis
supplied). This section of the Uniform Act, therefore, differs from section 8305 in that
it is not a single-act provision. For the text of section 1.03(a) (3) and a list of the
states which have enacted the Uniform Act, see note 49 supra. For a general discussion,
of the Uniform Act, see Woods, The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far
Side of Jurisdiction, 22 ARK. L. REv. 627 (1969). For a similar provision, see N.D.R.
Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (C) & (D).
76. Id. at 919.
77. Id.
78. Id. For a discussion of the problems involved in determining the locus of a
tortious act, see notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra. To date, however, no court
has confronted - or even mentioned - the illogical result produced by refusing to.
limit section 8305 to tortious activity.
79. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra. It is apparent that the legisla-
ture could also have made section 8303 clearer in this regard. See id. However, since
it appears that "tortious acts" in section 8303 was intended to have a restrictive effect,
requiring the activity to occur within Pennsylvania, the legislature would not have
been concerned about restrictive court interpretations with respect to the scope of
that section.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8305 (Supp. 1975). For the text of this section,
see note 6 supra.
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and not include financial loss. The basis of this contention is the fact that
while section 8305 contains only the term "harm," the legislature used the
phrase "harm or financial loss" in section 8304.81 The argument concludes
that the legislature must have preceived some difference between "harm"
and "financial loss," and that it did not intend section 8305 to cover financial
loss. 2 However, in Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe,83 a
federal district court concluded that the plaintiff's loss of income and profits,
as well as damage to trade name and reputation - purely financial injury
- resulting from the defendant's torts of conspiracy and intentional inter-
ference with contractual relations, satisfied the requirements of section
8305.84 Subsequently, the determination that "harm" includes financial as
well as personal injury has been followed by every court within Pennsyl-
vania which has had occasion to consider the question.85
3. "Any" Harm Within Pennsylvania
Regardless of the way that "harm" is defined, section 8305 requires a
determination that "any harm" has occurred within Pennsylvania. There
appear to be some situations in which this determination may present sub-
stantial analytical difficulty. Particularly troublesome are situations such as
those where a plaintiff received negligently performed services or purchased
defectively manufactured goods outside of Pennsylvania, but was within
the state when any resultant injury manifested itself. One such situation
was presented to a federal district court in McAndrew v. Burnett.8"
McAndrew involved a suit against a New York doctor who had allegedly
left a hemostat in a patient's body during an operation in New York.87 At
the time of the operation, the doctor and the patient were both residents
of New York.8 8 After the patient moved to Pennsylvania, he was X-rayed
by another doctor who discovered the existence of the hemostat.8 9 The
patient later died as an apparent result of the first doctor's negligence. 0°
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8304 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). For the
text of this section, see note 5 supra.
82. Even if it is assumed that the inconsistency in the language of the two sections
was due to poor draftsmanship rather than an intention to establish "harm" and
"financial loss" as separate categories of injury, it is illustrative of the lack of precision
and clarity which is characteristic of the Pennsylvania long-arm.
83. 368 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
84. Id. at 1296. The court seemingly equated "harm" with "injury." The court's
conclusion, however, was arguably dictum because of its finding that, under the par-
ticular facts of the case, there were not sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due
process. Id. at 1299.
85. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Action Indus., Inc. v.
Wiedeman, 236 Pa. Super. 447, 453 n.6, 346 A.2d 798, 801 n.6 (1975).
86. 374 F. Supp. 460 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
87. Id. at 461.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Following the hemostat's discovery, the defendant-doctor made phone
calls and a trip to Pennsylvania for consultation. Id. at 461-62. However, because
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However, the court held that jurisdiction over the nonresident doctor was
not permitted by either the Pennsylvania long-arm statute or by due
process. 91 Discussing section 8305, the court held that the harm had oc-
curred in New York when the hemostat was left in the patient's body.
92
Thus, although the court stated that the patient suffered injury while in
Pennsylvania, 93 it concluded that no harm had occurred within the state
within the meaning of section 8305.94 In reaching this conclusion, the court
stressed the fact that the doctor-patient relationship had terminated when
the patient moved to Pennsylvania 5  The McAndrew court also found
support in Wright v Yackley,"0 a Ninth Circuit decision which involved
a malpractice suit brought by an Idaho citizen against a nonresident doc-
tor.97 However, the principal issue in Wright was whether, assuming valid
jurisdiction under Idaho's long-arm statute 8 the exercise of jurisdiction
would have violated the requirements of constitutional due process.09 The
court determined that in the case of negligently performed personal services,
due process requires that the "focus must be on the place where the services
are rendered."100 The Wright court recognized that the consequences of
personal services are felt wherever the person who receives them chooses
to go,10 1 but rejected the idea that the negligent performance of personal
services is "a portable tort which can be deemed to have been committed
wherever the consequences were foreseeably felt [as] wholly inconsistent
with the public interest in having services of this sort generally available."
10 2
Because "[m] edical services in particular should not be proscribed by the
he was not licensed to practice within the state, he did not take part in the surgery
to remove the hemostat. Id. at 462.
While the plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under sections 8303, 8304, and 8305, the
McAndrew court rejected the applicability of section 8303 because it held that the
tortious act of leaving the hemostat in the decedent's body was committed in New
York and not within the Commonwealth. Id. at 462-63. For a discussion tending to
support the proposition that section 8303 is properly limited to acts done only within
Pennsylvania, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id. at 462. Because the court also held that the Pennsylvania long-arm
provides jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, McAndreur
might later be distinguished as a case that was in reality based solely upon due
process grounds.




96. 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972).
97. Id. at 288. In Wright, an Idaho resident brought suit against a South Dakota
doctor. The original treatment was in South Dakota. Four months after the patient
moved to Idaho, the doctor, at the patient's request and without charge, sent her copies
of the original prescription. She was allegedly injured by the use of the prescribed
drugs. Id.
98. Id. The court assumed that a tortious act had been committed within Idaho
under the relevant long-arm provision, which provides for jurisdiction over any person
who "commi[ts] a tortious act within this state." IDAHO CODE § 5-514(b) (Supp. 1975).
99. 459 F.2d at 288.
100. Id. at 289.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 289-90.
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doctor's concerns as to where the patient may carry the consequences of
his treatment and in what distant lands he may be called upon to defend
it,"'103 the court held that jurisdiction over the doctor was unreasonable
and thus unconstitutional.10 4
Section 8305, however, does not distinguish between the tortious per-
formance of personal services and any other tortious activity. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that the special due process rules developed by Wright
to deal with personal service cases supported only McAndrew's constitu-
tional analysis, 10 5 but did not aid the McAndrew court in its conclusion that
jurisdiction over the New York doctor was inconsistent with the language
of section 8305.106 It would seem that the statutory problem faced by the
McAndrew court - whether the locus of "any harm" was within Penn-
sylvania - was not due to the fact that the case involved personal services,
but to the fact that the allegedly negligent act was committed in New York,
by a New York doctor, upon a New York patient. 07 The court concluded
that it was in New York that the harm was suffered because it was in that
state that the hemostat was left in the patient's body. 0 8 However, it appears
that the harm to the patient in McAndrew was not the act of leaving the
hemostat in his body during the operation, but the effects which that act
had upon him. Although the plaintiff's harm arguably manifested itself
initially in New York where the patient first felt pain and discomfort, 109
the language of section 8305 is very broad, requiring only that "any" harm
was suffered by the plaintiff within Pennsylvania. Because the plaintiff
clearly suffered harm - in the way of "much expense, pain, and ultimately
death" - within the state,110 it is submitted that this requirement of the
section's language was satisfied."'
This interpretation of section 8305 - i.e., that "any harm" includes
the initial manifestation of injury or any subsequently manifested injury -
appears to have been adopted by a federal district court in Miller v. Ameri-
103. Id. at 290.
104. Id. at 291. The court concluded that "no tort was committed within the State
of Idaho which would constitutionally confer jurisdiction under that state's long-arm
statute." Id. The court found support for its constitutional analysis in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 37 (1971). Id.
105. The court in McAndrew held that jurisdiction over the nonresident doctor
was inconsistent with due process, 374 F. Supp. at 462, and then analyzed the require-
ments of the long-arm provisions in light of the factual situation.
106. The court in Wright assumed that the requirements of a long-arm provision
totally dissimilar to section 8305 were satisfied. See note 98 supra.
107. 374 F. Supp. at 463.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 461. However, it was not until the patient had moved to Pennsylvania
that the X-ray was taken which revealed the existence of the hemostat. Id.
110. Id.
111. It would seem that McAndrew reached the correct result - that jurisdiction
over the nonresident doctor was improper - but it is submitted that it should have
avoided its statutory interpretation and simply based its decision on the fact that
jurisdiction would clearly have violated due process. See Miller v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 58, 63 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ; note 113 infra.
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can Telegraph & Telephone Co.112 In Miller, the court stated in dictum
that "[s]ection 8305 requires only that 'any harm' within Pennsylvania
be evident which was caused by the same conduct from which the pending
cause of action arises."' n
3
Therefore, it is submitted that the fact that the plaintiff received negli-
gently performed services or purchased defectively manufactured goods out-
side of Pennsylvania does not mean that the plaintiff could not have suffered
harm within the state for purposes of section 8305, although the mere fact
that the plaintiff is a Pennsylvania resident would not be sufficient for
jurisdiction under the section. For example, if a Pennsylvania resident
had the brakes of his automobile negligently serviced in New York - or
purchased defectively manufactured brakes in that state - and then re-
turned to Pennsylvania where his brakes failed, causing an accident which
resulted in injury to the plaintiff, it is submitted that harm was suffered
within Pennsylvania for the purposes of section 8305 because the injury
manifested itself within the state. However, if a Pennsylvania resident had
his automobile damaged in an accident in New York, it would seem that
no section 8305 harm occurred in Pennsylvania since all of the plaintiff's
injuries manifested themselves outside of the state. The most difficult
problem analytically would seem to present itself in the situation where the
Pennsylvania resident suffered physical injuries in the automobile accident
in New York, and then returned to Pennsylvania where he lost wages or
suffered other related economic injury as a result of the injury suffered
in New York. It would seem, even in this situation, that a literal interpre-
tation of the section's language would indicate that harm was suffered
within Pennsylvania, thus satisfying section 8305.
In each of the above hypothetical situations, assuming that the respec-
tive defendants had no other contacts with Pennsylvania, it would seem
that jurisdiction over the nonresident would be constitutionally suspect.
The advantage of interpreting section 8305 in this manner, however, and
then applying due process requirements to limit the instances in which
jurisdiction would actually be exercised over a nonresident defendant, is
that it would seem to simplify the analysis of the section and at least result
in consistent interpretation of its language.
112. 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
113. Id. at 63 n.4. Miller involved a derivative suit brought by shareholders of
AT&T concerning a $1,500,000.00 debt allegedly due AT&T from the Democratic
National Committee. Id. at 60. The individual defendants were directors of AT&T,
none of whom were residents of Pennsylvania. Id. at 61. The court, assuming that
AT&T, as a corporation, was harmed in Pennsylvania, stated that the plaintiff share-
holders were thus harmed to some extent. Id. at 63 n.4. However, the court had
doubts that the section 8305 was intended to take cognizance of such indirect harm.
Id. It thus based its decision denying jurisdiction upon the unconstitutionality of the
assertion of jurisdiction over the individual defendants, id. at 63, and avoided having
to definitively construe the section's language. Id. at 63 n.4.
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4. Causation
In Stifel v. Lindhorst,"4 a federal district court complicated matters
even further by holding that section 8305 requires an additional inquiry
beyond the determination that harm was suffered within Pennsylvania.
Stifel involved a suit brought by a convicted murderer against his attorneys
for allegedly violating his civil rights." 5 After his trial and conviction in
Ohio - the state where the murder had occurred - the plaintiff had been
sent to federal prison in Pennsylvania." 6 While in Pennsylvania, the plain-
tiff was allegedly harmed by certain conduct of his attorneys which took
place in Ohio.' 7 The court, however, construed the language of section
8305 to require "the cause of the harm, not merely its effect, to occur
within Pennsylvania though the actor is outside the state."" 8 Because the
cause of the plaintiff's alleged harm was in Ohio, the court held that section
8305 did not support jurisdiction." 9
Stifel was the first and only decision to state that section 8305 requires
a determination of the locus of the "cause" of plaintiff's harm. This inter-
pretation of the section's language would seem to present a major obstacle
to the application of the section. Although the court gave an example of
a situation where it thought that its new requirement would be satisfied -
a libelous letter written outside of Pennsylvania and mailed into the
state120 - it is submitted that in most cases the cause of the plain-
114. 393 F. Supp. 1085 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
115. Id. at 1087. The plaintiff contended that his attorneys had sabotaged his
murder trial by turning confidential information over to the F.B.I. Id. at 1086. His
attorney in a subsequent civil suit in Ohio allegedly joined in a conspiracy to cover up
the prior conduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1970). Id. at 1087. The com-
plaint alleged a conspiracy which continued to the date of the instant decision. Id.
116. After being convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (1970), the plaintiff was
sentenced to life in prison and sent to the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania. Id.
117. Id. at 1087. The alleged harm caused to the plaintiff within Pennsylvania
consisted of:
1) Unmeritorious motions filed in Ohio courts which caused the plaintiff,
while in Pennsylvania, to expend time and money;
2) Threats against [plaintiff's witness] which were communicated (appar-
ently by [the witness]) to the plaintiff in Pennsylvania;
3) General mental anguish caused by the frustration of dealing with bad faith
attempts to circumvent the plaintiff's civil suits in Ohio.
Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1088.
119. Id. The court considered the plaintiff's claim to be the type of "portable tort"
which had been rejected in Wright and McAndrew. Id. Although the most serious
harm suffered by the plaintiff was his conviction in Ohio, it is submitted that the
attorney's "cover-up" conspiracy, which occurred while the plaintiff was in prison
in Pennsylvania, caused harm to the plaintiff within the state, thus satisfying the
requirements of section 8305. See note 117 supra. Further, taking the plaintiff's allega-
tions as true, it does not appear clear that jurisdiction would have violated due
process. The court, however, did not comment upon the constitutionality of the
assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident attorneys.
120. 393 F. Supp. at 1088 n.7.
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tiff's harm, at least from his perspective, would be properly considered to
be the defendant's activity. Because the section expressly requires the
defendant's activity to occur outside of Pennsylvania, Stifel's requirement
that the cause occur within the state would seem to present a "Catch-22"
situation. Thus, it is submitted that, in order to achieve its purpose, section
8305 must require only the determination that any injury was suffered
within Pennsylvania which had a causal connection with the defendant's
out-of-state conduct. That is, the causal nexus between the activity and
harm must be found, but the section does not, and could not without being
rendered nugatory, require a determination that the locus of the cause of
the plaintiff's harm was within Pennsylvania.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the patent ambiguity of the language of section 8305, any
court interpretation would arguably be subject to criticism for being con-
trary to legislative intent. Certainly this holds true for those decisions
which thus far have dealt with the scope of the term "harm"' 21 or the
question of whether the section should be limited to tortious activity.
1 22
This Comment, however, is not meant as a criticism of those courts which
have interpreted section 8305, but rather of the Pennsylvania legislature for
its failure to be more precise in the language of the entire personal injury
long-arm statute.
The trend of most recent cases is clearly in the direction of interpreting
the Pennsylvania long-arm statute to provide for jurisdiction over non-
resident individuals to the full extent permitted by constitutional due
process.' 23 Confronted with the present statutory language, it is sub-
mitted that the courts have reacted normally by interpreting the statute
to cover situations which clearly satisfy the "fundamental fairness" con-
cepts of due process. However, the state legislature has expressly provided
for jurisdiction coterminously with the Constitution only with respect to
suits against foreign corporations. 124 Nowhere in the long-arm scheme
was an equivalent provision made applicable to individuals. This dichotomy
in treatment between individuals and corporations is underscored by the
general rule that a single act is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over an
individual under the "doing business" provisions of the statute. 125 It would
seem, therefore, that the legislature did intend to restrict its courts' juris-
diction over nonresident individuals in some manner.
121. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 66-79 and accompanying text supra.
123. Some courts have expressly stated that the Pennsylvania long-arm statute
provides jurisdiction over nonresident individuals to the full extent permitted by the
Constitution. See, e.g., McAndrew v. Burnett, 374 F. Supp. 460, 462 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
124. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (Supp. 1975). For the text of this
section, see note 9 supra.
125. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
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A legislative decision not to provide for long-arm jurisdiction to the
fullest extent permissible under the Constitution is certainly defensible.
Maintaining specific statutory jurisdictional provisions allows a state to
provide that certain connections with the state greater than those required
to satisfy due process should be necessary for some policy reason to confer
jurisdiction over a nonresident individual. Well-defined statutory require-
ments also afford a certain amount of notice to potential litigants of the
likelihood that a court will exercise jurisdiction on a particular set of facts.
Jurisdiction coextensive with constitutional requirements subjects the par-
ties, as well as the courts, to the rather nebulous and subjective due process
concepts of "minimum contacts" and "fundamental fairness." The appli-
cation of these concepts may at times result in seemingly inconsistent de-
cisions and a corresponding difficulty in predicting whether certain activity
will be determined by a court to have satisfied constitutional requirements. 2 6
Further, restrictive long-arm jurisdiction may be reflective of a state's
legitimate desire to avoid the greater burden of cases which would fall upon
its courts if jurisdiction were extended.127 Whatever advantages that may
inhere in restricted statutory jurisdiction, however, are lost when the lan-
guage is as vague as in Pennsylvania's long-arm statute.
In view of the questionable judicial decisions concerning the proper
scope of section 8305, particularly by federal courts within the Common-
wealth, it is submitted that the legislature should either amend the current
long-arm statute to make the desired limitations upon personal jurisdiction
over nonresident individuals explicit, or enact a new statute providing that
such jurisdiction should extend to the fullest extent permissible under the
Constitution. It is submitted that the latter alernative is desirable because,
despite all of the problems inherent in having jurisdiction limited only by
due process, 128 it would allow the courts to make a decision based upon the
particular facts involved in each case. This would simplify a court's inquiry
because it would no longer have to decide whether it had statutory power,
but would be required to answer only the constitutional questions. Further,
courts would not have to stretch or reshape statutory language, as it is
submitted is often done in this area, in order to find statutory jurisdiction
in a situation that clearly satisfies due process.
129
126. See Comment, International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction - How About
Pennsylvania?, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV. 319 (1970). While the authors accepted in
principle the position that Pennsylvania's long-arm jurisdiction should be extended
to the maximum extent allowed by due process, they felt that a statute which would
subject nonresidents to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts to the extent per-
mitted by the Constitution would result in too much uncertainty. Id. at 328, 352.
Instead, they concluded that a comprehensive long-arm statute, along the lines of the
Uniform Act, would best serve Pennsylvania's interests. Id. at 352.
127. See Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1001.
Pennsylvania's interests. Id. at 352.
128. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 11 supra.
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Finally, the legislature's decision that individuals and corporations
should be treated differently may be understandable,"30 but it does not seem
that this necessitates a statute restricting jurisdiction over nonresident
individuals to specifically enumerated situations. It would appear that,
while applying the principles of due process to the situation before it, a
court would clearly be able to recognize any inherent differences which
there may be between corporations and individuals.
1 1
Don 0. Burley
130. See Developments - Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1006.
131. It has been cogently argued that due process requires more substantial con-
tact with the forum state when jurisdiction is sought over a nonresident individual
rather than a foreign corporation because individuals as a class are less likely to be
able to litigate in a distant forum. See id. at 935-36.
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